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JACQUES J. POLAK
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
A. THE INTERNATIONAL SECTOR IN GNP TABULATIONS
1. The smallness of "net foreign investment"
IN typical tabulation of the gross national product of the
United States,1 the international sector is summarized by the•
heading "net foreign investment." In magnitude, the item is
small in most normal years, and in many abnormal years as well.
In 1949, it was $422 million against a CNP of $256 billion. In
the 21 years from 1929 through 1949, net foreign investment ex-
ceeded 1 percent of GNP oniy five times. Its statistical unim-
portance, as measured by its presentation in the GNP tables of
the Department of Commerce, may further be inferred from
the fact that it was smaller than the "statistical discrepancy" in
1.6 of the same 21 years. In 8 of these years, the statistical dis-
crepancy would have been smaller if net foreign investment had
not been added into GNP (Table 1).
It is to this very small item that this paper is addressed. But
before proceeding to a discussion of the techniques of projection
in the international sector, it. will be necessary to clarify the
nature of the item. In the process, we shall also make clear that
the smallness is in part arbitrary and the result of the stepchild
treatment which this particular item appears to have received
from national income statisticians.2
2. Treatment of the foreign sector on a net basis
The first arbitrary reason why the foreign element in the social
Note: The author is an official of the International Monetary Fund. The
views expressed in this paper are his own.
1 See, for instance, Survey of Current Business, "National Income Num-
ber," July 1950 (Department of Commerce).
2 In fact, the foreign sector played an even smaller role in the first
national income estimates of the Department of Commerce, when only the
net of dividends and interest was included as an entry, "International
Balance of Property Income," the last line on income paId out by "Mis-
cellaneous Industries." See National Income in the United States, 1 929-35
(Department of Commerce, 1986), p. 232.
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TABLE 1
GRoss NATIONAL PRODUCT, NET FOREIGN INVESTMENT,








1929 103.8 0.8 —0.1
1930 90.9 0.7 —0.7
1931 75.9 0.2 1.2
1932 58.3 0.2 14
1933 55.8 0.2 1.2
1934 64.9 0.4 0.9
1935 72.2 —0.1 —1.3
1936 82.5 —0.1 0,9
1937 90.2 0.1 1.1
1938 84.7 1.1 —0.1
1989 91.3 0.9 1.4
1940 101.4 1.5 1.8
1941 126.4 1.1 1.6
1942 161.6 —0.2 2.3
1943 194.3 —2.2 0.9
1944 213.7 —2.1 4.0
1945 215.2 —1.4 4.9
1946 211.1 4.8 1.7
1947 233.3 8.9 0.3
1948 255.1 1.9 —2.9
1949 255.6 0.4 —1.9
Source: Survey of Current Business,"NationalIncome Number," July
1950 (Department of Commerce).
accounts appears relatively so small is that a general tendency to
move in the direction of more "gross" concepts in the national
income field has (at least in the United States) stopped short
of the foreign sector.3 In Kuznets' article on "National Income"
in the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, one still finds national
income defined essentially as what is now called "personal dis-
posable income." Taking this definition of national income as a
starting point, we could write according to the now customary
formulae:4
Many European countries show the foreign sector "gross"; for example,
Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Sweden, among
others, shows invisibles "net," but some countries provide gross figures for
the entire foreign sector.
Corporate undistributed profits and similar refinements are omitted here.
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National income =Consumption+ net home investment +
government deficit + net foreign investment
In this equation, which one aiso finds implicit or explicit in
the early writings of the Keynes school, all three items—home
investment, the government deficit,5 and foreign investment—are
on a net basis. Gradually, however, the tendency of national
income statisticians seems to have been to "gross up" the two
former items. Home investment was made gross by adding de-
preciation on both sides of the equation; the government section,
by adding government receipts and taxes on both sides. Taking
these two steps in reverse order, we first add, on the left, taxes
to disposable income and obtain national income; and on the
right, taxes to the government deficit and obtain governmental
expenditure:
National income =Consumption+ net home investment +
government expenditure + net foreign investment
Then we add depreciation to both sides:
Gross national product = Consumption + gross home investment
+ government expenditure + net foreign investment
The reader conversant with modern national income details will
observe many omissions in these equations—indirect taxes, trans-
fer payments, etc. These have been omitted purposely so as not
to clutter up the picture and so as to simplify the point which is
to be made: that in "grossing up" the national income concept,
oniy the foreign sector has been left out.
Services and donations8 apart, net foreign investment equals
exports minus imports. It often strikes the not quite so sophisti-
cated reader as odd that in order to arrive at national income or
at GNP, one should deduct imports. The answer is that imports
are included in the other elements on the right-hand side of the
equation, and that they have to be excluded to arrive at the net
domestic value added of the consumption goods, investment
goods, and export industries.
But the same sort of argument which leads to the inclusion of
depreciation lends support to the idea of not deducting the im-
port component in the output of consumer goods, investment
goods, and exports. At the last stage of the grossing up process,
Which Robertson called "honorary investment." See "Mr. Clark and the
Foreign Trade Multiplier," Economic Journal, Vol. xLxx, June 1989.
8Weshall discuss donations below.
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we come to what might—if a term is needed—be called gross
Output:7
Gross output =GNP+ import of goods and services =Gross
value of home consumption + gross value of home investment
+ gross value of exports
Though I do not want to press too strongly for yet another
member of the already proliferating family of national income
concepts, the preceding paragraphs will have made clear that one
reason why the foreign sector looks disproportionately small in
total GNP is the net procedure presently followed with respect
to that sector.8
3. Elimination of donations from the foreign sector
The second reason why, at least in postwar years, the foreign
sector appears so small lies in the treatment of international
donations in GNP. In the absence of donations, the surplus
on account of goods and services in the balance of payments
must be equal to net foreign investment—although each can
be measured separately and the difference between the two,
if any, usually called "errors and omissions," need not necessarily
be allocated to the capital sector of the balance of payments as
is implied in the present treatment in the GNP calculations in
the United States.
It should be noted that, even in that situation, "net foreign
investment" enters into GNP, not because investment in foreign
countries has anything to do with the GNP of the United States,
but simply because of the numerical equality of net foreign in-
vestment to the surplus on account of goods and services. It is
this surplus which is the real component of GNP.
If the surplus is met in part by donations, such as European
Recovery Program aid or emigrants' remittances, instead of by
Thisconcept differs from that of "Gross Available Resources" as used
in a number of countries in that the latter is obtained by deducting exports
and hence equals GNP + Imports —Exports.See National Income Sta-
tisfics, 1938-1947 (United Nations, 1948).
8Thepractice of treating both the government sector and the foreign
Sector on a net basis has led to the parallel development in both fields of
confused and indeed wrong ideas—the ideasthat only a government
deficit or only an export surplus could be expansionary—which have only
recently been corrected. Cf. Trygve Haavelmo, "Multiplier Effects of a
Balanced Budget," Econometrica, October 1945, and j.J.Polak, "The
Foreign Trade Multiplier," American Economic Review, Vol. xxxvii, No. 5,
December 1947.
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changes in the United States foreign assets and liabilities position,
so that net foreign investment is no longer equal to the surplus
of goods and services, the proper entry is the surplus and not
net foreign investment. Obviously, it makes no difference to ac-
tivity and income in the United States whether exports are fi-
nanced by a United States loan or paid in gold (both cases of
net foreign investment), or whether they are given away as a
grant. Nonetheless, it is net foreign investment and not the sur-
plus on goods and services which appears on the United States
GNP account. Why?
The explanation for this can be found in the treatment of other
sectors of the economy in GNP accounting. It can most readily
be explained by reference to the very simplified balance of pay-
ments presented below. In this presentation all transactions in
goods and services are combined and, also for simplicity, dona-
tions to the United States are left out of account.
United States Balance of Payments
Debit Credit
Goods and services (G&S) Goods and services (G&S)
Commercial imports, C & S MCommercial exports, C & S










Capital (net) Capital (net)
Net foreign investment NFl
On the basis of these entries, the net surplus on account of goods
and services, which may be considered as the element of GNP
associated with the foreign sector, equals E1 + E2 +E3 —M.
The "net foreign investment" which is actually entered into the
GNP calculations by the equality of the two sides of the balance
of payments9 equals E1 —M—D1—D2.Hence, it is lower than
Assigning "errors and omissions" somewhat arbitrarily to the capital
account.
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the surplus on goods and services by the deduction of all dona-
tions, both in kind and in cash. This treatment is made possible
by the entries under "government expenditure" and "personal
consumption expenditure." Gift exports from the United States'°
financed by government grants are entered as government pur-
chases of goods and services, whether technically they are pur-
chased by the government or not. Gift parcels sent by private
persons or through such organizations as CARE are lumped to-
gether with (or, more accurately, not distinguished from) per-
sorial purchases for domestic consumption. Governmental grants
abroad in cash, such as Economic Cooperation Administration
dollars made available for procurement in Latin America, are fic-
titiously entered under "government purchases from abroad."
Private cash remittances abroad are, again fictitiously, entered as
a specified item of personal consumption, in the general group of
"foreign travel and remittances." It will be seen that, by this pro-
cedure—matching these scattered items against the net foreign
investment item—the addition made to GNP is the same as if all
four items were omitted from government and private consump-
tion expenditure, and the net surplus on account of goods and
services were entered into GNP.11
Here, as in the previous section, there is no one particular treat-
ment which can claim to be the most rational. In order that the
difference between government expenditure and government re-
ceipts equal changes in the government debt (and similar items),
it is necessary to enter both E2 and D1 under government ex-
penditure. If personal income minus personal expenditure is to
equal personal saving, E3 and D2 must be listed as personal ex-
penditure. But, similarly, if the balance of payments is to balance,
donations must be entered into it. If all this is done, however,
and the surplus on account of goods and services is entered as
an element of GNP, all donation items are counted twice.
There are various solutions to this problem of double counting.
The one followed in the United States GNP computation is to
keep the government and private sections of the social accounts
in balance, but to rearrange the balance of payments in such a
way as to avoid the double counting and, in the process, to make
it virtually unrecognizable as a balance of payments. Thus, while
10Suchgifts in kind purchased abroad by the U.S. Government are
entered under purchases from abroad.
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one can perhaps still understand the treatment of governmental
grants in cash as "government purchases from abroad" in the gov-
ernment account, it becomes a little hard to recognize the same
item when presented as "sales to United States government" in
the account "transactions of the rest of the world with the United
States." Clearly the more elegant solution would be to have all
three accounts—the government account, the personal account,
and the balance of payments—in a form in which each can be
read and understood by itself, and to take care of the double
counting by an adjustment entry in the GNP total.
4. Foreign aspectofnet foreign investment
Even including donations, however, the surplus on goods and
services is still a relatively minor factor in relation to the total
United States GNP. But, in considering the importance of pro-
jecting this element of GNP, we must bear in mind that from an
entirely different point of view it is considered a crucial mag-
nitude. The same magnitude—or a closely related magnitude—
which carries the colorless name of "net U.S. foreign investment"
in the GNP context appears with the flashing title of the "world's
dollar shortage" in connection with the major payments problems
of the world. The "dollar shortage" can be defined in various
ways.12 It may, for instance, be defined as (1) the surplus of the
United States balance of payments on goods, services, and private
donations, which is equal to net United States foreign investment
plus net official United States foreign grants, or as (2) the amount
of "compensatory official in the United States balance
of payments, which differs from the definition under (1) prima-
rily in that it deducts the net outflow of capital from the United
States on private account and on government account for special
purposes. Whatever the precise definition chosen, the dollar short-
age, as an ex post statistical concept, tends to come close to the
net foreign investment item in GNP, especially if foreign grants
are included in this item rather than in government expenditure.
While, for national income purposes, the .projection of the net
foreign investment item may be of relatively minor importance,
the accurate forecasting of the balance of payments of the United
12FritzMachiup, "Three Concepts of the So-Called 'Dollar Shortage,'"
Economic Journal, Vol. Lx, March 1950, pp. 46-68.
18InternationalMonetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, 1938,
1946, 1947.
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States is of cardinal importance in connection with the world's
payments problems.
It is important in this connection to stress that the benefit which
foreign countries derive from their relations with the United
States do not arise primarily from the United States export sisr-
plus of goods and services, but from the gross total of dollars
made available through United States imports plus grants.14 The
elasticity of demand for a good part of the imports from the
United States, such as essential foodstuffs and many types of
machinery, is small. The elasticity of supply of many commodi-
ties exported to the United States is also small, at least in the
short run. Accordingly, the gains from trade with the United
States on the intramarginal units are very considerable and may
well be larger than the gains from additional free imports out
of grants. In addition, many countries limit their imports from
the United States below the level of market demand at the exist-
ing rate of exchange for the dollar—or, in other words, maintain
their exchange rate (in terms of units of national currency for
one dollar) below the equilibrium rate. In these circumstances,
there is a gain even on the marginal trade.15
5. "Supply of dollars"
To indicate this gross concept of the purchasing power over
United States goods and services made available to the rest of
the world, the term "supply of dollars" has been frequently used
in recent years. This supply of dollars was defined originally'6 as
the gross purchases of goods and services, plus private dona-
tions, plus the gross outflow of long-term capital. It would, in
terms of the postwar situation, require to be amended to include
governmental grants as well.
This concept of the supply of dollars, whatever its precise defi-
nition, had the advantage of bringing into focus two important
aspects which, while not novel, need stressing: (a) that the de-
mand for United States goods and services, i.e., the demand for
14 United States capital is left out of consideration for a moment. It will
be brought in presently.
For the underlying concepts see,e.g., Sidney S. Alexander, "The
Relative Cost of Devaluation and Import Restriction as Instruments for
Improving the Foreign Trade Balance," International Monetary Fund,
Staff Papers, Vol. i, No. 3.
16 Hal B. Lary, The United States in the World (Government
Printing Office, 1943).
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U.s.dollars, can never be considered independently of the
supply of dollars by the United States; and (b) that in this sup-
ply of dollars, the supply through United States lending of capital
is of very great importance, next to the supply by the United
States purchase of goods and services.
Both points may require some important qualifications which
are of particular importance in the context of the recent postwar
years, although, strictly speaking, they also applied In
the first place, the supply of dollars, as a factor influencing,
though not uniquely determining, the demand for dollars, should
not be considered as equal to the current flawofdollars to
foreign countries, but consideration should also be given to
the stockofdollars, gold, and various other assets in the hands
of foreign countries. The observation is similar to that applicable
to the explanation and forecasting of total consumption in the
postwar years; we should not only use the variable "income,"
which, on the whole, gave a satisfactory explanation before, but
should take account of the consumers' accumulated stock of
money and "near money." A particular feature of the postwar
demand for United States exports was that international reserves,
which were actually low in real terms by prewar standards, be-
came excessive in view of the greatly impoverished situation and
the urgent needs of the war-stricken foreign countries.
Secondly, it should be stressed that while there are important
•similarities between the supply of dollars through the purchase
by the United States of foreign goods and services, on the one
ha.nd, and the export of United States capital, on the other hand,
there are also very important differences. The most important
difference is that no current resources have to be given in return
for dollars obtained by a loan. A second difference is the restric-
tion on dollars obtained through certain loans. Thus loans by the
Export-Import Bank are "tied"—i.e., usable only for purchases
in the United States—by practice or by law. On account of institu-
tional ties, direct investments by United States companies are
likely to lead to exports from the United States rather than from
other countries.
For this latter reason, a given amount of additional dollar sup-
ply provided by increased United States imports will have a
17Onthese points,cf.J. H. Adler, "The Postwar Demand for U.S.
Exports," of Economic Stati,stics, Vol. xxvrn, February 1946, PP.
23-38.
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greater in reducing the "dollar shortage" than the same
additional supply provided by capital exports. The latter will
tend to lead to more "new" demand for imports from the United
States, caused by the limitations (legal, contractual, or practical)
on the use of these dollars by the country receiving them and
will hence contribute correspondingly less to the reduction of the
dollar shortage which previously existed. For purposes of policy,
therefore, foreign lending or capital exports by means of direct
investment of x million dollars is not a substitute for increased
United States imports of the same amount.
6. Items to be considered
While net foreign investment may be entered into a tabulation
of GNP estimated for the future on a net basis, this net figure
will always have to be derived on a gross basis. It is not in-
tended in this paper to discuss every item of the United States
balance of payments, but rather to concentrate on those im-
portant items on which it may be possible to shed some additional
light. The discussion will be limited, therefore, to imports (Sec-
tion B), exports (Section C), and official loans and grants (Sec-
tion D). We shall omit both services and private donations and
capital movements.19
In the treatment to be followed, we shall use without much
distinction the expressions "explanation," and "pro-
jection." Most forecasting consists in the extrapolation of a re-
lationship; and the same relationship, read with reference to the
past, must represent a satisfactory explanation of the variable we
want to forecast, if we are to use the relationship with confidence
in regard to the future.
B. IMPORTS
1. The standard explanation
Ever since Professor Paish2° coined the term "marginal propensity
18Abstractingfrom the effect of increased income abroad on demand for
imports—a point discussed below.
There is no implication, as Mr. Fabricant seems to suggest in his Corn-
rnent, that these latter flows are less independent, or of denying their fin-
portance or their interrelation with ixnports and exports. They are omitted
simply to limit the discussion. The issue of causal or definitional equality is,
therefore, not at all at stake here.
2°F. W. Paish, "Banking Policy and the Balance of International Pay-
ments," Economica, Vol. m (N.S.), November 1938, pp. 404-22.
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to import," the relationship between fluctuations in income and
fluctuations in imports has received a good deal of statistical at-
tention from economists. Taking into account, also, the more
classical factor of relative prices as a determinant of imports, a
number of attempts have been made in the last 10 years to ex-
plain, statistically, fluctuations in United States imports by refer-
ence to (a) United States national income or a closely related
variable and (b) the relative prices of imports and United States
commodities. Usually these calculations have been made in "real"
terms, i.e., the volume (quantum) of imports has been explained
in terms of fluctuations in real income. Table 2 gives the result of























Chang 4 1919-39 0.89 —0.01 0.84
a Sources: (1) Imre deVegh, "Imports and Income in the United States
and Canada," Review of Economic Statistics,1941, pp.130-46;(2)
T. C. Chang, "International Comparison of Demand for Imports," Review of
Economic Studies, 1945-46, pp. 53-67; (3) J. H. Adler, "United States
Import Demand during the Interwar Period," American Economic• Review,
1945, pp. 418-30; and (4) T. C. Chang, unpublished study prepared at the
International Monetary Fund (1948).
b Elasticity with respect to industrial production index.
Taking this collection of correlations (which cover practically
the same period and, with the exception of the first, use very
similar data) as a whole, the results are not too satisfactory. The
correlations, while high, still leave something to be desired; the
income elasticity shows some uncertainty, and the price elas-
ticity appears to be altogether uncertain.
Similar calculations were made by Chang,21 R. Hinshaw,22 and
the United States Department of Commerce23 for the five main
classesof United States imports. Perhaps the most striking
21 Sources 2 and 4 of Table 2.
22 Unpublished study of the Federal Reserve Board.
23 SurveyofCurrent Business, July 1946 (Department of Commerce),
p. 18.
387THE INTERNATIONAL SECTOR
aspect of these correlations for the various classes is that the fit
is generally a good deal less satisfactory than for imports as a
whole, although the groups themselves are large enough for us
to expect cancellation within them of accidental fluctuations.
When postwar national income data were substituted in these
correlations for total imports and for the five classes of imports,
they were widely used as a yardstick of comparison between
actual imports in 1946, 1947, and 1948 and "expected" or "calcu-
lated" imports for these years.24
The differences between the actual and the calculated data
have been differently interpreted. Thus, allowance has been
made for decreased rubber and silk imports caused by the pro-
duction of synthetic rubber and rayon and nylon. But on the
whole these calculations were, for a long time, used as forecasts,
if not of the actual, then at least of the normal, imports into the
United States at given levels of income. Thus, in February 1949,
the Survey of Current Business wrote, under a caption "Imports
Still Relatively Low":25
"Despite their high dollar value and their larger volume as
compared with 1947, commodity imports in 1948 were, in real
terms, only 5 per cent above previous high levels reached in
1929 and 1937. On the basis of the prewar relationship between
domestic economic activity and imports, at least 1.8 billion dollars
of additional imports could have been absorbed here in 1948.
Although actual imports were somewhat closer to calcu-
lated imports in the first three quarters of 1948 than in 1947, there
was still a large deficiency of imports from Europe and a smaller,
though substantial, lack of imports from Asia. After omitting
from the calculation for Asia imports of raw silk which has been
displaced to a large extent by the use of synthetic fibers, and
250,000 short tons of rubber, the legal minimum volume for do-
mestic synthetic rubber production, the apparent deficiency in
imports from Asia and Europe was about 2.5 billion dollars. On
the other hand, actual imports from other areas, particularly
North America, were about 0.7 billion dollars in excess of the
value projected on the 1921-38 relationship between gross na-
tional product and imports from those continents.
"The large discrepancy between actual and calculated imports
24"TheBalance of International Payments of the United States, 1946-48,"




from Europe was mainly in finished and semi-manufactured
goods, those economic classes of imports which showed the great-
est deficiency.... Atthe same time, the deficiency in imports
from Asia was apparently greatest in crude materials and manu-
factured foodstuffs, although for crude materials as a whole the
deficiency (excluding silk and 250,000 tons of rubber) was more
than compensated for by increased imports from South America
and Africa.
"Such a development indicates that the 1921-38 relationship for
certain economic classes or areas has been somewhat modified
and that imports from the Western Hemisphere and Africa may
well remain higher than the amount calculated on the basis of
historical relationships, because of our increased dependence
upon foreign sources for commodities such as nonferrous metals
and petroleum."
It may be noted that, while it is admitted that the relationship
for imports from the Western Hemisphere may have changed
permanently, there is no suggestion that the same applies to
Europe or Asia.
The recession of 1949, when the decline in industrial activity
in the United States produced at once a decline in imports (in-
cluding imports from Europe), might well have shattered the
myth of the "shortage of imports," and should have made it ob-
vious that the prewar relationship had been broken and that a
new relationship had been reestablished on a considerably lower
level. Nevertheless, the Department of Commerce, while far more
careful and stressing in detail the replacement of imports by
domestic production, still concludes that "it is difficult to say
whether the future American market for foreign goods may be
understated or overstated by projections derived from past re-
lationships between imports and gross national product."2°
2. Inadequacies ot the approach
Surveying these results, we can hardly consider them as satis-
factory. All we have by way of explanation of this variable, which
is of crucial importance, not only for the United States, but also
for the rest of the world, is a number of rather simple explana-
tions of either an aggregate or its standard subdivision into five
categories. These correlations have been used widely as (quali-
26TheBalance of Intenwtional Payments of the United States, 1946-1948
(Department of Commerce, 1950), p. 60.
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fled) forecasts and, while they have failed to yield good fore-
casts, they have not (like the early postwar unemployment fore-
casts) been entirely discarded.27 It seems useful, therefore, to
stress some of the weaknesses of these explanations.
3. Wealcnesses in the correlation
In the first place, the correlations for the interwar period appear
to have been as high as they were in part by accidental cir-
cumstances, Adler28 recently found the high correlation coefficient
between real CNP and the volume of imports of 0.9929 for the
years 1923 to 1937 to be to a large extent "the result of two unique
events—the repeal of prohibition in 1933 and the serious drought
of 1934-37—which caused United States imports to be larger at
21 Attention may be drawnhereto a general theory as to the fate of
forecasts which are not confirmed by events. If the event forecast was a
bad event—such as the postwar unemployment—which does not materialize,
the forecaster is blamed and the forecast forgotten. But if the event is a
good event—more dollar exports for Europe—the forecast remains alive,
though it tends to become a target rather than a forecast; and the blame
for nonfulfillment, if any, attaches not to the forecaster, but to the economic
group which should have done more to bring about the good event. The
following quotation from the source quoted in the previous footnote is
instructive in this connection:
"By contrast, projections made on the basis of prewar experience may
overstate the demand in this country for traditional imports from Asia and
Europe. Our markets for major interwar exports from Asia, such as silk,
rubber, and burlap, were particularly affected by the large-scale use of
domestically produced substitutes. At the same time, the products of United
States factories also competed far more effectively than before the war with
imports of goods from Europe. An additional development,
which may continue to cause lower than prewar imports from these areas
relative to domestic incomes was the shift during the war and postwar
years from European and Far Eastern countries as sources for certain United
States import commodities (see above) to Western Hemisphere countries
and Africa, and the emigration of many workers with special skills to the
United States or other non-European countries.
"It is possible and even probable, however, that Far Eastern and Euro-
pean export industries may be able to surmount many of these handicaps
to traditional exports by greater output and reduced prices, and by appeal-
ing to quality preferences of American consumers. The revival and modern-
ization of export industries abroad, and the heretofore unequaled efforts
to stimulate exports to this country by means such as the assignment of
priorities to export industries and market research, may well result in the
expansion of other new types of exports to the United States to offset rela-
tive declines in sales of other products to this country."
28 H. Adler, Eugene Schlesinger, and Evelyn Van Westerborg, "The
Pattern of United States Import Trade since 1923, Some New Index Series
and Their Application" (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1952).
29 This correlation is apparently a different one from that referred to in
Table 2.
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the end of the period than they would have otherwise been. If
that part of the increase in imports between 1933 and 1987 which
was caused by these two random factors is removed from the
series, the coefficient of correlation of imports with gross national
product falls to +.83. This adjustment obviously influences any
projections of the postwar level of imports to gross national prod-
uct. Total United States imports for 1948, as. estimated from the
experience of the interwar period, would be $1,630 million smaller
when adjustments are made to take account of the effects of the
drought and the repeal of prohibition than when no such cor-
rection is made, and would to that extent be closer to actual im-
ports in that year." Thus, the very premise that we had a "good"
explanation of U.S. imports, which could with confidence be ex-
trapolated, needs questioning.
It would seem, also, that it will be necessary to deepen our
insight intO the factors which caused fluctuations in imports and
thus to arrive at better explanations and more reliable forecasts.
4. Downward trend in U.S. imports
For the relatively short interwar period on which the existing
correlations are based, it was possible to explain fluctuations in
imports without the use of a trend factor. Nevertheless the exist-
ence of such a trend, at least in the long run, would seem to be
plausible and to require investigation before interwar relation-
ships are applied to forecast imports for a period some 20 years
later. Thus, the expansion of the American market made possible
the economic production within the country of goods previously
imported. The stream of migration brought to the United States
skills whose products had previously to be bought from abroad.
Probably most important, the increase in per capita income di-
rected an increasing proportion of consumption toward services
which, while some of them can be imported in the form of tourist
services, in any case do not enter into the statistics of commodity
imports. It is not surprising, therefore, that the ratio of United
States imports to CNP has so far shown a pretty persistent tend-
ency to decline (Table 8).
Table 3 (which is in terms of values and therefore not directly
comparable with the correlations underlying the forecasts, all of
which were in real or quantity terms) shows a number of inter-
esting features. Taking the 80-year period as a whole, there is a
striking decline to about one-third in imports, compared with
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TABLE S
RATIO OF IMPORTS TO GNP, 1869-1949
(IN CUF(RENT DOLLARS)










It would not seem that this figure was high on account of the war
years. For the partly overlapping decade 1904-13, the ratio was 4.8 percent.
b Average of percentages for individual years.
Source: Report to the President on Foreign Economic Policies (Gray Re-
port) (Government Printing Office), p. 124andsources mentioned there.
GNP.3° This decline is, however, by no means smooth. Thus,
despite the interruption of many commercial ties in World War I
and the persistence of the secular tendencies mentioned, the ratio
for the twenties was not much lower than it had been in the
early part of the century. The sharp break between the twenties
and the thirties may in part be because of the increased tariff.
Lastly, the postwar figures appear to be not far below the aver-
age of the thirties. But this may well be because of the fact that
the four postwar years were all boom years (by the standards of
the thirties). Compared with the last previous boom year, 1937,
the average postwar percentage was about one-fourth off (2.5
percent as against 3.4 percent).
There is, in any case, sufficient statistical evidence of the ex-
istence in the past of a downward trend in imports compared with
GNP to make it necessary to allow for this trend in forecasting.
5. inventory cycles and imports
The regression coefficients found by correlating imports and na-
tional income over the interwar period have been mostly deter-
mined by the major waves of that period: the rise in the twenties,
the decline from 1929 to 1932 or 1983, and the recovery there-
after. For these major swings the income elasticity of demand
8O A forecaster in the seventies who had been told that the 1949 GNP
would be over $250 billion might have forecast imports at $18 billion.
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for imports (in real terms)appearsto have been close to unity.
But inspection of the data shows that the elasticity is far greater
for shorter cycles. Thus real GNP increased by about 4 percent
from 1936 to 1937 and then declined again by about 4 percent
from 1937 to 1938. But the volume of imports increased by 11
percent and then fçll by 38 percent, indicating an average
elasticity over this short cycle of something like 6. Again, in
the short recession in 1949, when real GNP declined only a few
percent even on a quarterly basis, the volume of imports declined
by 7 percent (third quarter of 1948 to third quarter of 1949).
It seems probable that the high income elasticity of imports
in short cycles is associated with inventory fluctuations which
dominate both these short cycles and the volume of imports dur-
ing them. Chart 1, which compares changes in the total volume
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rected for trend, indicates an exceptionally clear relationship be-
tween the volume of imports and inventory changes, which war-
rants more intensive and rigorous investigation. It is not the
"goodness of fit," however, which is the most striking attribute of
the chart. Even more interesting is the consistency with which
imports lag inventory fluctuations—generally by about one-quar-
ter. This consistency of lag tends strongly to support the hypothe-
sis that inventory fluctuations explain the short-run fluctuations
in imports.
Our primary concern in this paper is with projections for a
relatively long run. In that connection, inventory fluctuations
and associated fluctuations in imports, which appear to be char-
acteristic of very short cycles, are not of importance in themselves.
But, if undetected, they are important as disturbing elements in
the correlation; and, if properly allowed for, they will improve
the correlation and lead to more reliable forecasts, even though
it is (or has to be) assumed that these short-run fluctuations do
not play a role in the period for which the forecast is made.
6. Summary
We have indicated two important respects in which import cor-
relations may be improved. But mere correlation of total imports
with a few more explanatory variables than have hitherto been
used will not automatically yield a satisfactory basis for forecast-
ing imports. A much more intensive study than has been made
so far of the imports of individual commodities or the imports
from countries or areas is likely to shed a good deal of additional
light on the factors which determine imports. It is not obvious
that the detailed analysis of a great many commodities will lead
to a more reliable forecast than can be made on the basis of
reasonable aggregates; but such an analysis by commodities will
probably contribute to finding the most effective way of deriving
the best estimate from these aggregates.8' In making these fore-
casts it will be realized that we have outgrown the marginal
propensity to import as a general-purpose statistical coefficient
—though its usefulness as an analytical tool in economic models
is by no means exhausted.
Since the United States is the dominant buyer for many world
81Theimportance of changes in inventories, for instance, became quite
clear as a result of an unpublished International Monetary Fund study
prepared by Mrs. M. Holzman, on the imports into the United States of
many individual commodities.
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market staples, there is a strong positive correlation between the
volume of imports and the prices at which they are purchased.
To the extent that one relies only on this (supply) relationship
in forecasting United States import prices, one might just as well
estimate the value of imports directly on the basis of those in-
ternal United States variables which are believed to explain fluc-
tuations in the volume of imports.
The preceding discussion has been concerned mostly with
factors which explain changes in the volume of United States im-
ports. Where the objective is to project GNP or the balance of
payments in value terms, imports would also have to be pro-
jected in such terms. The best procedure for this may be to pro-
ject the prices of imports separately, in addition to the volume of
imports.
C. EXPORTS
In the previous section we have discussed the methods to be
employed in explaining (with reference to the past) and in fore-
casting (with reference to the future) the value of U.S. imports.
We have shown the difficulties involved in this operation and
pointed toward some unsatisfactory aspects of the work done in
this field. But in spite of difficulties and errors, the explanation
of fluctuations in U.S. imports is not fundamentally different from
the explanation of fluctuations in any other part of GNP. Refine-
ments in technique may be required and, no doubt, in due course
be applied; but the entire explanation of U.S. imports runs in
terms of variables which themselves are part of the U.S. economy.
These include national income or GNP itself. In this respect im-
port forecasting is no different from the forecasting of any other
sector in the social accounts, in that the part depends upon the
whole, and some knowledge, or provisional estimate, about the
whole is necessary before the part can be estimated. This diffi-
culty is faced everywhere, and it can be met by successive ap-
proximation, by assumption, or sometimes by policy decisions with
respect to the whole. In this respect, therefore, the forecaster of
U.S. imports faces no problems different from those that confront,
say, the forecaster of the demand for automobiles.
When we pass over to exports, we enter into an entirely new
field. The decision to buy U.S. exports lies primarily abroad.82 In
82Weleave out of account here the donated exports like lend-lease,
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order, therefore, to explain U.S. exports, we shall have to explore
and bring into our system the decisions and reactions of nonresi-
dents. The amount on which these decisions bear is substantial:
$12 billion in commodity exports alone in 1949, nearly 6 percent
of the total national income. To make sensible forecasts about
these exports, we shall have to know both the underlying situa-
tions abroad and the responses of foreigners to these situations
with respect to U.S. exports.
It might be thought that the most convenient and most logical
way to explain U.S. exports would be to parallel the explanation
of U.S. imports. Correlate the income of the world outside of the
United States with U.S. exports and you have your relationship,
symmetrical to the import equation, which would determine the
magnitude of U.S. exports. This procedure was actually followed
by Ilinshaw and and by Tinbergen;34 but it is obviously
unsatisfactory, because the "marginal propensities to import from
the U.S." of different countries are so widely different that the
aggregation of their national incomes for this purpose is not
permissible.
But what if we took the national incomes of individual coun-
tries and applied to them individually some "marginal propen-
sities to import from the U.S."?35 It would appear that even this
procedure. would not work out very satisfactorily for a variety
of reasons::
1. In many countries imports are at present subject to quanti-
tative restrictions and the size of imports is, therefore, not only
(and as to its short-run fluctuations, not primarily) determined
by the demand for imports on the part of its residents, but also
(rather) by governmental decisions as to the stringency of the
controls.
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration shipments, or gift
parcels.
Randall Hinshaw and Lloyd A. Metzler, "World Prosperity and the
British Balance of Payments," Review of Economic Statistics, Vol. xxvii,
November1945, pp. 156-70.
J. Tinbergen, "Some Remarks on the Problem of Dollar Scarcity,"
paper presented to the International Statistical Conference in Washington,
September 1947, Proceedings of the International Statistical Conferences,
Vol. v, pp. 73-97.
85Aninteresting attempt in this direction is made by J. H. Adler in "The
Postwar Demand for U.S. Exports," op.cit. In an attempt to explain fluctua-
tions in U.S. exports, Adler weights fluctuations in industrial production in
foreign countries by their average share in U.S. exports.
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2. Even in situations where the government exercises no direct
control on imports and where, therefore, the relationship be-
tween national income and imports may be presumed to be oper-
ative, it may not be particularly fruitful to consider imports as
a function of national income. Indeed, in many countries it is
probably more reasonable to read this relationship in theoppo-
site direction: the possible value of imports determines the pos-
sible level of national income. This level of national income is
then brought about by the government's monetary policy, in par-
ticular its banking policy and its fiscal policy. Often the equilib-
rium situation is reached by trial and error; if the monetary policy
is too expansionist, reserves dwindle and the policy is then ad-
justed to the country's possibilities.
3. But even where income is freely determined by market
forces rather than by government policy, and where no restric-
tions are imposed on imports which are demanded on the basis
of this level of income, how do we know the level of income to
be used in forecasting U.S. exports? Would it be necessary to
estimate GNP or national income for all other countries, or to
estimate the world's income by a set of simultaneous equations,
in order to estimate the exports and the income of the U.S.? To
some extent this is indeed the case. But certain short cuts are
possible which will enable us to have a reasonable knowledge
of U.S. exports without going through the estimation of the na-
tional income of all the countries of the world. The reason for
this is that, in most foreign countries, factors coming from abroad
are the most important factors responsible for fluctuations in
national income and, hence, in imports; and quite often these
factors outweigh domestic factors in the explanation of changes
in imports.
It is, therefore, possible to bring to bear the weight of foreign
decisions on U.S. exports without knowledge of the national in-
comes of foreign countries. There is also much to be said from
the purely statistical point of view for an approach which does not
hinge on the use of national income data for all countries of the
world. In too many countries this sort of statisticsis absent
or available only in a very rudimentary stage; and, in some coun-
tries, national income data, including considerable sections re-
flecting production outside of the market sphere, are probably
a poor indicator in any case of the demand for imports.
We shall indicate below (he outlines of a method to estimate
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U.S. exports by means of a world system of relationships. The
significance of this system lies in its application for long-run fore-
casting rather than short-run forecasting. For the short run, say,
the next year or two, one might well obtain better results by
making reasonably informed guesses as to what each country
would import from the U.S. But even in making such guesses, it
would be helpful to have as a background the knowledge of the
relationships in such a general system, although for the short run,
information concerning a variety of special factors, such as the
inception of a particular development program, the postponement
of certain categories of imports, etc., is likely to be more impor-
tant for accurate forecasting than the ability to make refined al-
lowance for longer-run tendencies.
When we suggest procedures for forecasting or planning the
value of U.S. exports, it is obvious that we are dealing with a
subject of far greater intrinsic importance than the magnitude
of U.S. exports alone. We are dealing with the progress of devel-
opment abroad; with the balance of payments of whole areas,
such as Europe and the Far East; with the conditions for con-
vertibility of currencies or the continuance of discrimination;
and, as far as any foreign aid or foreign lending program is
concerned, also with U.S. budgetary aspects. We are touching,
moreover, in the present world situation on a problem of pro-
found military importance, both in the narrow sense that in-
vestment goods exported may have to be produced at the
expense of certain military items, and in the much more funda-
mental sense that an adequate plan for the development of under-
developed countries may constitute a long-run substitute for
military expenditure.
In constructing our model, we must choose the country as our
unit. Our intention is to find rules concerning the behavior of
countries with regard to their imports. Initially, we shall concen-
trate on total imports and then separate imports from the United
States from these. But can we reasonably speak of the "behavior"
of a country in international economic relations as if it has any
similarity to the behavior of a consumer, or a firm, or an industry?
When we refer to the behavior of a country, we try to reflect in
one expression three different sets of behavior:
1. In the first place, there is the behavior of its residents, which
we could register for each person individually but which, for
reasons of cOnvenience and the availability of statistical data, we
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aggregate by countries and sometimes by regions. We could, if
we wanted to, study separately the exports from the U.S. to each
Canadian province; but itis more convenient to consider all
Canadian residents as a group in a study of U.S. exports. If gov-
ernments followed a neutral monetary policy (whatever that may
mean precisely) and did not apply any restrictions to interna-
tional trade, the behavior of a country would simply be an ex-
pression for the aggregate behavior of all its residents.
2. We should take account also, however, of monetary policy
measures taken by the government of a country in the light of
that country's balance of payments situation. These measures may
affect income and thereby imports. Sometimes they may be direct
measures, such as the institution or retardation of a government's
development program; sometimes these measures are more gen-
eral, the government operating through bank credit, the money
supply, taxes, or government expenditure.
3. The government may operate directly on foreign trade rather
than through the more general economic variables which deter-
mine imports. These latter measures may include such restric-
tions as import quotas, tariffs, and multiple exchange rates. In
our present context, we are little interested in the measures, and
more in the effects which they are expected to achieve.
When we speak, therefore, of the behavior of a country as an
element in a foreign trade model, we refer to these three aspects
of this behavior.
1. Factors determining other countries' imports
a. EXPORTS
Amongthe factors which will primarily determine most countries'
(though not the United States') behavior with respect to their
imports is the value of their exports. Let us first consider a
country whose foreign exchange reserves are at an "equilibrium
level." It is not suggested that this implies that the reserves are
"adequate" in any absolute sense of the term. For reserves, as
for imports, the concept of certain absolute requirements, while
useful for programs and plans, is quite unusable to describe the
behavior of a country. Therefore, when we refer to an equilibrium
level of reserves, we mean this in the sense of what the responsi-
ble authorities in the country consider as the amount which the
country "can afford" and "must afford."
Let us assume that there is an increase in exports which is not
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offset by a reduction in domestic demand. This increase will
raise incomes by the same amount and it will also affect imports
through the three channels of behavior which we have just indi-
cated. The income of exporters will go up and, through the well-
known multiplier mechanism, this will lead to an increase in im-
ports. In terms of the simplest multiplier equation, the increase
in imports will be less than the increase in exports, provided the
marginal propensity to save (or the "marginal propensity to ex-
cess-save," or the "marginal propensity to hoard") is greater than
zero.
Assuming that this marginal propensity is thus in excess of
zero, the country's foreign exchange reserves will go up and the
government is likely to stimulate or permit more expansionist
developments, thus further increasing the demand. for imports.
In those countries where the government relies on restrictive
methods at the trade level, it will also attempt to relax these
restrictions, increase quotas, lower tariffs, etc.
It is not of great importance for our model in the first instance
by which of these three channels the change in exports leads to
an increase in imports. In fact, it is most convenient for us if we
can combine the reactions through the three channels into a
single parameter indicating the behavior of the country. I have
indicated this parameter as the "international reflection ratio."
It indicates the magnitude in the change in imports which wouk
come about in response to a change in exports. If M stands for
the value of imports and X for the value of exports, then the
international reflection ratio would be defined as follows:
p = or = (1)
If account is taken only of the reactions through the behavior of
individuals and the simplest multiplier pattern is followed, it will
readily be seen that
(2)
where m is the marginal propensity to import and s is the mar-
ginal propensity to save. This expression < unity if the marginal
propensity to save is positive. Even then, however, p will tend
to approach unity as reactions through the second and third
channels come into play.
J. J. Polak, An International Economic System (University of Chicago
Press, 1953).
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The use of a single parameter to describe the behavior of a
country does not imply that the country's response to a particu-
lar change will always be the same or will be constant over time.
Statistical measurements of phaveactually been made with some
measure of success,37 but these measurements are of no particular
concern to us in this context. For planning purposes, it will be
necessary to have a figure for p.Possiblyit can be obtained from
observation of the past; perhaps it can better be estimated in some
other manner. In any case, it is probably safe to say that a great
many countries have such urgent development needs and are so
keenly aware of them that they have a persistent tendency to
overimport; in these countries pislikely to be very close to unity.
Most of them have a very low marginal propensity to save, which
would make for a value of pofclose to unity on account of in-
dividual behavior alone; and whatever increases in reserves are
left over are likely to be used by the government.
b. LONG-TERM CAPITAL MOVEMENTS
With reference to the past, long-term capital movements may be
taken into account in a manner quite similar to that for exports,
so that only the total supply of foreign exchange needs would be
considered. This procedure is justified because, in the past, it was
normal for the total financing of any capital project to come from
abroad. Thus a foreign loan of $1 million would tend to lead to
investment of the same amount, and hence income of the same
amount (less the import component of the investment). Foreign
investment of $1 million would then presumably have roughly the
same effect on national income and on imports as exports of $1
million.
This simple equivalence of long-term capital imports and ex-
ports cannot be assumed to hold with respect to. the future. The
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for in-
stance, does not normally lend to a country the total cost of an
investment project, but only the import cost.38 Until recently, it
ibid.
38Articleiv, Section 3(c) of the Articles of Agreement of the IBRD
reads as follows on this subject: "The Bank, if the project gives rise indi-
rectly to an increased need for foreign exchange by the member in whose
territories the project is located, may in exceptional circumstances provide
the borrower as part of the loan with an appropriate amount of gold or
foreign exchange not in excess of the borrower's local expenditure in con-
nection with the purposes of the loan."
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was the Bank's policy never to lend for any local currency ex-
penditure in connection with a project. While this policy has now
been relaxed, it will continue to be true—and indeed it is desir-
able—that the value of the projects sponsored by the IBRD will
exceed the amount lent by that agency.39 National legislation in
many countries limiting the extent of foreign participation in new
industries may also tend in the same direction. It will, therefore,
be necessary to make allowance for the fact that, in the future,
a capital import of amount L should not, in its effects on imports,
be considered as equivalent to an export of the same amount L,
but rather to eL, where e stands for the "expansion ratio," that is
to say, the ratio of additional investment to additional foreign
This expansion ratio is not constant, either between
countries or over time. It will, in each case, depend on the whole
nature of the country's borrowing plan. We may, therefore,
write"
M=p(X+eL) (3)
C. USE OF RESERVES
For purposes of forecasting U.S. exports in the early postwar
years, it seemed reasonable to assume that foreign countries
would use up all their available resources: the proceeds
of their dollar exports, loans, grants, and whatever dollar re-
serves they felt they could spare. The events of these years seem
Allowance should also be made for the fact that the financing of a
particular project with foreign capital does not necessarily indicate a net
increaseof investment over what it would otherwise have been.
40SeeJ. J. Polak, "Balance of Payments Problems of Countries Recon-
structing with the Help of Foreign Loans," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
April 1943.
"We pass from the somewhat clumsy equation in terms of etc.,
used in (1), to this form in terms of M, etc. It should be understood that
all equations are assumed to be linear only in the neighborhood of present
values for the variables and that these variables should, accordingly, be
considered as differences from present values.
A theoretical point needs to be made here, to which Mr. C. D. Finch of
the staff of the Fund has drawn my attention. With respect to exports, we
express all the resultant expansion of imports through the coefficient p.
whether the expansion is brought about directly through the behavior of
individuals or indirectly through governmental responses (Section C-i-a).
For foreign investment, however, governmental responses are indicated by
the expansion ratio e, so that, with reference to the term eL, the reflection
ratio should be limited to the first item, i.e., mf(m+s). It may be noted
that the maximum expansion ratio is (m+s) /m, so that the maximum for
peL equals L. It seemed more convenient to deal with this point in a
footnote than to complicate the formulae to allow for it more explicitly.
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to lend particular credit to Kindleberger's account of the chronic
dollar shortage as a world-wide problem, an account which may
perhaps, with slight oversimplification, be phrased: "All other
countries will always have a dollar shortage because they will
want to spend more dollars than they earn or have."
The experience of 1950, when almost all foreign countries in-
creased their holdings of gold and dollars (by a total of $2.8
billion), must have come as a shock to those who believed in this
relatively facile explanation of U.S. exports. There had, how-
ever, been numerous indications that this explanation was quite
inadequate, at least as far as the European countries were con-
cerned, and reflected only the very peculiar conditions of the early
postwar period. Thus, Italy, which had ended the war with vir-
tually no reserves, had acquired $200 million in dollars in 1946,
nearly $800 million in gold and all foreign exchange in 1948, and
$850 million in gold and all foreign exchange in the course of
1949. While countries had shown themselves prepared to run
payment agreement debts up to the limits provided by these
agreements in 1946, 1947, and 1948, many of the credit and even
grant facilities provided under the Intra-European Payments
Scheme of 1949-50 failed to be taken up. There was quite a bit
of evidence, therefore, before 1950, that international trade could
not be explained in terms of an insatiable hunger for imports
limited only by the availability of funds. The desires to acquire
reserves, to curb inflation, and sometimes to provide protection to
domestic industries all played roles in determining the magni-
tude of imports.
It may be that the accumulation of dollars and gold abroad in
1.950 represents, in part, a lag. Foreign individuals and foreign
countries simply have not yet had the time to adjust their spend-
ing plans to the increase in income and reserves. In fact, this
may be the most important explanation for the accumulation of
reserves as far as the underdeveloped countries are concerned;
for these countries, I believe, the "Kindleberger effect" is prob-
ably the rule rather than the exception. As far as the developed
countries are concerned, however, the increase in reserves should
be considered primarily as reflecting a deliberate policy. The
period 1946-49 was abnormal in the sense that during that period
many European countries held "excess reserves," which they grad-
ually used up to finance imports. It may appear odd to speak of
"excess reserves" in a time when reserves were low by all stand-
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ards of adequacy. They were high, though, by one standard: the
urgency of the import needs which they could meet. It seems
reasonable to consider countries, or perhaps rather governments,
as having an indifference curve linking the level of available
resources (from both imports and domestic production) to the
level of their reserves. This curve would presumably cut the
reserve axis at some point where available resources fall far below
normal. At that point countries would be prepared to go into
short-term debt to keep up the current flow of supplies. On the
other hand, the curve would probably rise pretty steeply after
some more or less normal reserve had been obtained. Not much
more can be said about this curve, but it is important to realize
its existence. The adjustment from actual reserves to the "desired
reserves" at any particular stage is not immediate. The "excess"
is not likely to be spent in a few months. It is budgeted over the
future, taking into account not only the present, but also the
future, level of desired reserves.
We can consider the period of 1946-49 as one of generally, al-
though not continuously, increasing income and hence gradually
increasing "minimum reserves." At the same time, actual reserves
for most countries continued to be in excess of minimum reserves
and reserves continued, therefore, to be drawn down.
It would not be fruitful to pursue this point further in general
terms. Enough has been said to make it clear that we should add
to our import equation an allowance for the amount of excess
reserves used during the period under consideration. We shall
indicate this amount by RE. It is clear that this symbol will stand
for a positive amount when reserves are being run down, i.e.,
when actual reserves are in excess of "desired reserves," and for a
negative amount when the reverse situation prevails.42 We then
obtain the following equation for imports:
M=p(X+eL)+RE (4)
It will now be necessary to pass from total imports to the im-
ports from one particular country, the U.S., in the problem which
concerns us. For this purpose, let us indicate bythe fraction of
country i's imports which it buys from country f.Thesum of these
42Logically,REmightbe derived as an endogenous variable of the
system. But there is a pretty narrow limit beyond which it does not pay
to allow in the system for more and more relationships and hence to be
burdened with more and more residuals, as these relationships do not hold
exactly.
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fractions over /willobviously equal unity. We then have the
the following equation for Mi), the imports of country i from
country j:
=a,j= + + RE 41 (5)
(i=1,...,n; j=1,...,n;
When we introduce the coefficient ajj, we do not intend to
indicate a purely statistical fraction. Rather itis implied that
this coefficient has a certain degree of constancy. This assump-
tion appears justified on the basis of the considerable stability
which appears to exist in the pattern of international trade. To
be sure, there are long-run shifts reflecting the emergence of
new import-trading countries, new consumer demands, and new
techniques; and also short-run disruptions, in part on account of
the overvaluation or undervaluation of individual currencies. For
reasons such as these, it would not be wise to lift thefor our
forecasting purposes from, say, the interwar period. In order to
do a reasonable job with reference to forecasting for a rather long
period, it will be necessary to take account, as best one can, of
knowledge of the shifts. It might be relatively less important to
make allowances for the effects of improperly valued currencies.
The reason for thisis that one ought to assume that, in the
longer run, improperly valued currencies will not persist: over-
valued currencies will tend to come in for devaluation, and under-
valued currencies will tend to lose their special advantage both
by increases in prices and by the devaluation of other currencies.
The set of equations shown by (5) indicates all trade flows
considered from the import side. Thus it contains some n( n —1)
equations explaining the same number of trade flows. In the
light of what we have said earlier, it does not seem reasonable to
use the same explanation for the United States imports, since
these are to only a very minor extent determined by the factors
listed.
It is readily seen that this set of equations also provides the
exports from each country to each other country and, by sum-
mation over the second subscript, the total exports of any coun-
try. Thus the exports of country k would equal
kto stand for the U.S., this would provide the answer to the
question that concerns us: the estimation of U.S. exports.
While the determination of the magnitude of a country'sex-
ports from the importing country's side appears a reasonable
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procedure as far as the industrial countries, including the U.S.,
are concerned, it may, in some instances, yield unsatisfactory re-
suits for countries whose exports consist of a few raw materials.
Within moderate limits our equations may satisfactorily explain
the exports of this sort of country also. But if the equations
indicate great changes—in particular, great increases—it may be
doubtful whether the productive facilities of these countries in
their particular export industries will be able to meet such de-
mands. If they are not, the export forecast may be relatively far
off, but it cannot be said in advance in which direction it will
be off. An attempt to satisfy increases in demand will tend to
lead to sharp price increases if the demand is highly inelastic.
The export value of the raw material countries will increase much
more than if productive facilities have been expanded to meet
the increased demand. If, on the other hand, the demand is very
elastic—for instance, because there are good substitutes for the
particular commodities—the export value may be very much less
than if capacity has been expanded in anticipation of the increase
in demand.
These objectives point to the necessity of checking the total
export figures forecast for particular countries against the likely
production possibilities of these countries, and possibly of modi-
fying to some extent our figures in the light of these checks. This
type of correction is again not different from that necessary in
the forecasting of certain segments of the domestic part of GNP.43
There aren —1)equations of type 5 to determine n( n —1)
trade flows. These equations are adequate to express the rela-
tionship of trade flows in terms of each other, but not to determine
the absolute amount of any one of them.
We may assume, however, that we know the value of U.S. im-
ports and its distribution. On the basis of the internal variables
of the U.S. economy, we can then (with L and RE as autonomous
variables) solve the system and obtain the value of any as
well as that of the exports of any one country. In other words,
we have, at least ideally:
(Mk; (6)
(i= 1,..., n;j1,..., n;
43Thereader will notice that these corrections are necessary because
prices have not been brought into the system explicitly. They could have
been introduced, but there is some risk in introducing additional parameters
about whose magnitude we do not—and, perhaps for a long time to come,
cannot—have any reasonable knowledge.
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in which each trade flow is expressed as a function (F45) of U.S.
imports, the capital import and expansion ratios of each country,
and the excess reserves of each country. In this expression F4,
depends on all the a45's in the system as well as on the p4'S; and
the partial derivative is constant if equations 6 are
linear. In other words, increases in U.S. imports wifi pull up the
entire system of trade flows, and, assuming a constant propor-
tional distribution of these imports, the increases in all trade
flows will be proportional to the increase in U.S. imports. If, to
give an example, the increase in U.S. imports from $8 billion to
$9 billion raises exports from Belgium to Chile in the situation
by $1 million, then a further $1 billion increase in U.S. imports
(from $9 billion to $10 billion) will raise Belgian exports to Chile
by another $1
d. PRACTICALUSEOF THE MODEL
It is believed that the model, in the form in which it has here
been presented, cannot be used for immediate practical applica-
tion; that is, to arrive at precise forecasts. A considerable amount
of work would be required to attain estimates for the a45's even
when countries are grouped into areas; and it may be difficult
indeed to obtain reliable estimates of these coefficients, which
are marginal, not average, propensities.45 But even before the
information necessary to use the model for forecasting is avail-
able, the model itself can be used to obtain qualitative conclu-
sions which may be of great importance for balance of payments
forecasting and, perhaps, of even greater importance for balance
of payments planning. Some of these conclusions have already
been touched upon, but they may be restated here in a somewhat
systematic form. Individual conclusions refer to partial effects;
that is, they are valid only on the assumption that all of the other
factors remain unchanged. Thus, when speaking of changes in
the magnitude of U.S. imports, we assume their distribution to
be constant; and when we speak of changes in the distribution
of U.S. imports, we assume total imports to be constant.
An increase in U.S. imports will lead to a smaller increase in
U.S. exports.46 This is so because (or if one prefers, on the as-
"Inthis statement, no account is taken of the effect through R2, which,
in some instances, may be important. Forthisreason,thefraction
is written as a partial derivative.
If i stands for a country thenis zero; but if i stands for an area,
ais is positive, reflecting the marginal intratrade of the area.
46Thisis a ceteris paribus statement. If U.S. foreign investment increases
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sumption that) the average of the p's in the system is less than
unity. A further factor tending in this direction is that a general
increase in U.S. imports will increase the general level of well-
being in other countries and thus raise the level of "desired re-
serves." This in turn will render RB negative.
Subject to one important qualification, an increase in U.S.
lending will increase U.S. exports more than an equally large in-
crease in U.S. imports. This is so for a variety of reasons: (a) U.S.
lending tends to be, to some extent, tied by either legal or insti-
tutional arrangements; (b) some U.S. lending, especially that
through the IBRD, will have an expansion ratio greater than
unity; (c) U.S. lending tends to be concentrated more than U.S.
imports in countries which have a relatively high marginal pro-
pensity to import from the U.S.
The important qualification to this general statement is that
it applies only to such lending as leads to additional investment
which otherwise would not have been undertaken. It is limited,
therefore, to what might be called project loans in the narrow
sense of the word, in that the project would not have been under-
taken had it not been for the lending.
The effect of increased U.S. imports on the increase in U.S.
exports will be greater the larger the reflection ratio of the coun-
try from which the imports are obtained and the larger the mar-
ginal share of imports from the U.S. in imports of this country.
It will readily be seen that if the U.S. increases its imports from
a country i whereequals unity andequals unity (the sub-
script k standing for the U.S.), the entire increase in the foreign
supply of dollars would come back at once as an increase in
U.S. exports. In a long-run equilibrium analysis, account should
be taken not only of the immediate return flow, but also of the
indirect effects through third and fourth countries. If all p's were
unity, or if the appropriate average of them were unity, it would
be immaterial where the initial expenditure by means of U.S.
imports was made, because, ultimately, all of the dollars would
tend to flow back to the U.S. But it may even be that the differ-
ence from unity of the p's in the system is so small all over the
world that it will make little difference in the equilibrium situa-
at the same time, the statement should be amended to read: An increase in
U.S. dollar availabilities from increased U.S. commodity imports and capital
exports will lead to a smaller increase in U.S. exports (vide point 4 in Mr.
Fabricant's Comment).
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tion where the U.S. spends its money for imports, so far as the
ultimate effect on the total value of U.S. exports is concerned.
The distribution of U.S. imports and lending is of much greater
importance for the total flow of world pagments than for the
value of U.S. exports. It might be inferred from the preceding
paragraph that it would be desirable for the U.S., all other things
being equal, to concentrate its imports in the countries for which
is the highest. This conclusion would be justified if the ob-
jective of U.S. imports and lending were to maximize U.S. ex-
ports—and even then, the justification for the conclusion might
not be strong if the p's all over the world were close to unity.
But it does not seem reasonable to assume that the objective of
U.S. imports and lending is to maximize U.S. exports.
Apart from the direct objective of individual U.S. imports and
individual acts of U.S. lending abroad—to obtain particular com-
modities or particular investments, or to stimulate particular de-
velopment possibilities in foreign countries—the general objec-
tive of the U.S. supply of dollars may reasonably be described
by reference to one of the purposes of the International Monetary
Fund: "to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of inter-
national trade and to contribute thereby to the promotion and
maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and
to the development of the productive resources of all members
as primary objectives of economic policy."4T
In many areas of the world, trade is restricted below the op.
timum on account of inadequacies of reserves. In a sense, the
supplying of dollars by the United States may be considered as
a method to oil the mechanism of international payments. Ob-
viously this purpose is not well served if the lubricant flows back
as quickly as possible to the place from which it came. It is best
served if the lubricant stays in the mechanism for a long time,
finding its way through all the channels of trade all over the
world. From this point of view, it would be desirable if pay-
ments on account of U.S. imports and U.S. lending were directed
to countries that (marginally) obtained a minimum of their im-
ports from the U.S. and a maximum from other countries. In
other words, U.S. payments should, from this point of view, be
directed to countries with a minimum
amaximum
4TArticlesof Agreement of theInternationalMonetary Fund, Article i(ii).
comparison—somewhat limping, as are all comparisons—might be
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The balance of of the U.S. cannot be explained or
forecast by reference to U.S. factors alone. In order to build up
our model, variables and parameters relating to foreign countries
have to be taken into account. The plural foreign countries (or
foreign regions) is essential. No useful purpose is served by op-
posing to the U.S. a magical "rest of the world" whose balance
of payments can be obtained by the easy trick of changing the
debit and credit headings in the U.S. balance of payments. This
"rest of the world" represents nothing at all in terms useful for
economic analysis. It is an amorphous aggregate about the be-
havior of which no useful statement can be made.
This is perhaps most strikingly indicated with regard to re-
serves. The observation that the reserves of one particular coun-
try, say, France, have increased has a very definite economic
meaning and may lead to certain definite consequences. It does
not matter for this purpose whether the reserves of all French
banks or all French business concerns have come up. Certain
action by the French government may be expected in response
to the change in the country's reserve position. On the other
hand, the statement that the reserves of the "rest of the world"
have gone up has very little meaning in terms of forecasting
events which will follow from this fact. For: (a) the increase in
reserves may have occurred in countries which heretofore have
had small reserves, and it may then stimulate additidnal imports;
(b) it may have occurred in countries which have had abundant
reserves, in which case it is likely to have very little effect on
imports; (c) the over-all increase may be compounded of a de-
crease in countries with adequate reserves and a greater increase
in countries with highly inadequate reserves, in which case it
may lead to a more than proportional increase in imports; (d) the
over-all increase in reserves may be compounded of a decrease
in the reserves of countries short of reserves and an increase in
the reserves of countries with adequate reserves, in which case
it may lead to a reduction in the imports of the rest of the world.
In order to be able to pass beyond meaningless statements of
alternative possibilities like the preceding, it will be necessary
made with deficit financing policies. It is often argued that deficit financing
does not "really" cost the government as much as it appears to cost because
part of the additional expenditure will return to the government as addi-
tional tax receipts. But it would obviously be absurd to plan deficit financ-
ing by so directing the government's payments as to maximize the return
from taxes in the first round, or even in all rounds.
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to have data on the balances of payments and the reserves of
individual countries. The balance of payments of the U.S. taken
by itself, read forward or backward, does not contain adequate
Infonnation for our problem.
Similarly, the solution to the imbalance of world payments
cannot be found by looking at the U.S. balance of payments
alone. It is merely a truism to say that, if the balance of pay-
ments of the U.S. were brought into equilibrium, the "dollar
shortage" would be over. While a situation of balance in the pay-
ments of the U.S. would ipso facto mean balance in the aggregate
payments of the "rest of the world," this latter over-all balance
could well be compounded of large deficits in some countries and
equally large surpluses in others, and if there were no longer a
dollar problem, the same balance of payments difficulties might
crop up in the form of a sterling problem or a cruzeiro problem,
or, simply and more generally, as problems of deficits and sur-
pluses.
Useful balance of payments forecasting must be in terms of
the behavior of countries, not simply in terms of definitional re-
lations which can be derived from the social accounts. It is clear
from the few equations shown earlier that they contain certain
parameters which are intended to describe the behavior of coun-
tries. We are not presently concerned with the question as to
how much we actually know about this behavior, how regular it
is, and with what confidence it can be predicted. The important
thing to bear in mind is that these coefficients reflect behavior.
The risk of interpreting as causal relationships concurrent changes
occurring in the various items in the social accounts is a general
risk, and economists and statisticians alike have to be constantly
aware lest they fall into the traps which they themselves set when
they started out in the social accounting business. In the field df
international payments, these risks are no smaller than in other
fields of social accounting. With regard to problems such as the
dollar shortage or discrimination, this sort of mistake is frequently
made.49 In practice, the need for caution often does not go be-
yond avoiding the identification of average propensities with
marginal propensities; but the problem is, in a sense, more funda-
49 In this connection I may mention, as an example, Ragnar Frisch, "On
the Need for Forecasting a Multilateral Balance of Payments," American
Economic Review, September 1947. Cf. my comment: "Balancing Inter-
national Trade: A Comment on Professor Frisch's Paper," American Eco-
nomic Review, March 1948.
411THE INTERNATIONAL SECTOR
mental in that it is necessary to distinguish behavior from ob-
served social accounting relationships.
D. OFFICIAL LOANS AND GRANTS
1. Introduction
We now come to the third important element in the balance of
payments which we intend to discuss from the forecasting point
of view: official loans and grants. These are entered as an "au-
tonomous variable," L, in our system of equations above. We
must now find an explanation for this variable.
Although the variable L referred to loans and grants by all
countries, this section will deal only with loans and grants by
the United States. This is not to minimize grants and loans by
other countries, in particular, capital exports by the United King-
dom in the form of releases of sterling balances. But we concen-
trate here on the loan and grant component of the U.S. balance
of payments, not on L as it affects U.S. exports.
2. No forecast possible
With regard to such balance of payments items as imports, ex-
ports, and tourist expenditures, it is often reasonably safe to rely
on "persistence forecasting," i.e., to assume that natura non facit
saltum, and that what happened recently is likely to continue to
happen in the near future. This procedure is, however, partic-
ularly inappropriate in the field of foreign grants and loans,
because they represent governmental decisions, which change
abruptly from one year to the next. Perhaps the most striking
example in recent history is the Marshall Plan. It is probably not
unreasonable to say that in May 1947, United States aid to Europe
for the year 1948 would have been forecast at a few hundred
million dollars at most (outside Germany and Austria, and per-
haps Italy and Greece). Yet, a few months later, after the Har-
vard speech of June 5, 1947 and after the Western European
countries had presented a four-year plan for $17 to 22 billion, it
suddenly became reasonable to estimate this aid for 1948 at a
number of billions of dollars. The difference between the two
figures reflects a decision, and items which are determined by
governmental decisions to. such a large extent are obviously not
suitable for pure forecasting by economists who are on the out-
side.
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The sections which follow, therefore, do not deal with the fore-
casting of these decisions, or with methods of forecasting them.
Rather they constitute an analysis of the possibility of basing the
decisions on rational factors, failing which, one would have to
consider them as a matter entirely outside the realm of economics.
In these discussions we shall limit ourselves to the development
aspect of foreign loans and grants. The period of reconstruction
aid is largely over, except for Korea. Many of the same consid-
erations apply, however, to aid for the two purposes, as the eco-
nomic problems of reconstruction and development are com-
parable in many respects.
8. Magnitude of the need
It is tempting to seek "objective" figures on the amount of foreign
aid required by reference to some standard of need, and it is
easy to point to the disparity in per capita income between the
underdeveloped countries, on the one hand, and Western Europe
and the United States, on the other hand, to show the existence
of a vast objective need for more capital. But how much? The
underdeveloped countries of the Far East (outside China), Af-
rica, the Near East, and Latin America, with a population of
about 1,075 million, have a national income of about $80 billion,
or an average of $75 per capita. For the United States, the figure
is about 20 times as high. To raise these areas to the U.S. level
would require additional income of roughly $1.5 trillion. In the
advanced industrial countries, the ratio of capital to income is
about four to one. Thus, to produce this much more income, at
least $5 trillion might be needed,5° or $100 billion a year for 50
years, assuming a stationary population and the increase of pro-
ductivity in the underdeveloped countries to the U.S. level with
an adequate supply of capital. Even on these assumptions, these
countries would reach the 1950 level of the United States only
in the year 2000, when the United States would be far ahead
of this level.
These figures are presented partly to show the magnitude of
the problem, but primarily to make clear by reference to the
factors that it cannot usefully be considered from the point of
view of absolute needs. This indeed is just as well. While eco-
nomic planning must be based on statements of objectives which
50Usinga somewhat lower ratio of capital to income than in the U.S. or
U.K.
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it is desired to achieve, these objectives themselves do not have
the absolute character of "needs" or "requirements" which can
somehow be objectively determined.5' Calculations of "require-
ments" often deceive by their apparent objectivity those who use
the figures as as those who compute them. It should always
be clear that they are nothing but derivations based on arbi-
trary assumptions, often of some average per capita level of con-
sumption. Since import requirements are the difference between
the computed consumption requirements and estimated domestic
supplies and often have to be met at prices much higher than the
domestic supply price, they are particularly subject to minor
fluctuations in the postulated consumption
4. What the United States can afford
Just as the criterion of need does not give us a clue to the proper
magnitude of a foreign aid program, so the criterion of what the
United States can afford is equally an irrelevant and useless
yardstick to apply. In connection with the Marshall Plan, the
question of "the limits within which the United States could
safely and wisely extend aid to Western Europe"53 was the sub-
ject ofwide political discussion and of extensive study by a Presi-
dential committee. But the report of the committee was devoted
almost exclusively to the question of the availability of particular
commodities, not to the ability of the United States to bear any
particular amount of aid in general; and with the disappearance
of the world wheat shortage shortly afterward, the entire prob-
lem of the ability of the United States to provide foreign aid of
any given dollar amount seems to have vanished from public
attention.
This is quite reasonable for two reasons. In the first place, the
optimum practicable amount of foreign loans and grants for de-
velopment purposes in the near future to all countries outside
the U.S.S.R. sphere is likely to constitute only a small proportion
of the United States gross national product. Whether the amount
51 Except in emergency situations and with reference to the most primary
foodstuffs.
52 A striking example: The computation of minimum meat requirements
for the countries of Eastern and Southern Europe which received UNRRA
supplies showed a difference in import requirements of a billion dollars
a year, according to whether one or another recognized standard of minimum
intake was used.
53 European Recovery and American Aid (President's Committee on
Foreign Aid, November 7, 1947), p. 3.
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is about $1.2 billion as suggested in the Gray Report, or even,
say, $5 billion (which would be 6 percent of the national income
of the countries concerned), it would, in any case, be within the
range of 1 or 2 percent of the $300 billion gross national product.54
Only if one were to consider large aid to Eastern Europe, the
U.S.S.R., and China55 might the total figure for developmental
loans and grants reach a high percentage of GNP—and such aid
would then, most obviously, be in substitution of very much larger
other demands on the national economy and on the budget. But
secondly, and more generally, it should be realized that one can-
not in any absolute sense (or in any sense whatever) speak of a
country's "abilily" to render foreign aid—any more than one can
speak of a country's ability to spend money on education or on
military preparedness. As put most explicifly in the Act for Inter-
national Development, development is an objective of United
States This objective must be valued on the national
scale of It must be weighed against alternative uses of
United States resources. This process of weighing may yield a
particular figure of the amount the United States is prepared to
spend on foreign aid. But this should not be regarded as the
amount which the United States cart afford. Foreign aid figures
of a number of billions a year would have been considered un-
thinkable 15 years ago. They are not unthinkable now, not be-
cause the United States is so much richer—although, of course,
it is—but because of a change in the schedule of values.
5. An optimum rate of capital inflow
Does it follow, then, that there is no objective criterion to guide
For a more extensive discussion of the concept of "capacity" for foreign
financing, see Horst Mendershausen, "Future Foreign Financing," Review of
Economics and Statistics, Vol. xxxi, November 1949, PP. 272-74.
Something in the order of the $50 billion, five-year plan proposed by
Senator McMalion in February 1950.
Public Law 535, Section 408(a) reads as follows; "It is declared to be
the policy of the United States to aid the efforts of the peoples of eco-
nomically underdeveloped areas to develop their resources and improve
their working and living conditions by encouraging the exchange of technical
knowledge and skills and the flow of investment capital to countries which
provide conditions under which such technical assistance and capital can
effectively and constructively contribute toraising standards of living,
creating new sources of wealth, increasing productivity, and expanding
purchasing power.
Horst Mendershausen, "Foreign Aid with and without Dollar Shortage,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. xxxiii, February 1951, p. 43.
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the decision of policy makers—a decision which forecasters may
try to forecast, or perhaps to influence? Or should one fall back
on determination by such short-run bottlenecks as were often
stressed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment in explaining the moderate rate of its lending in the
face of enormous need: the lack of detailed plans acceptable to
the Bank, or the lack of people who can make such plans? It
would seem that considerations of this sort, however pertinent
they may be to explaining developments in the short run, would
have little place in the making of plans for the longer period—
except that the plans themselves should provide for means to
break the bottlenecks. No one would base the scope of a long-
run program of disease control on the number of physicians
presently available.
It would appear that there is such an objective criterion—al-
though it is not precise and not subject to immediate statistical
application; that, in fact, there is an optimum rate of foreign in-
vestment from the point of view of the countries receiving the
capital.
It might seem at first sight that as far as capital-importing
countries are concerned, forgetting for a moment about the service
of the debt, there is no limit to the amount of capital they could
absorb, or at least, that this limit would be so far removed that
it would have no practical significance. Assuming investment to
proceed at a rate no higher than the rate of foreign capital in-
flow,58 why should not each country seek to obtain the largest
amount of investment and capital inflow that it can?
The answer to this question is primarily in terms of the mo-
bility of goods, both within the country and internationally: it is
the lack of mobility, or, in other words, the inelasticity of supply
of goods within the country or within certain regions of the coun-
try, which sets important limits on the amount of capital a coun-
try can absorb.
Let us take the case of perfect mobility of goods, both in-
ternally and through imports from abroad, and further assume
perfect elasticity of supply in the world as a whole—a reasonable
assumption if the country whose problem we study is relatively
small.59 An investment program of magnitude I per annum is
Or, indeed, no higher than the rate of foreign capital inflow times the
maximum expansion ratio.
The assumption may not be quite so reasonable as far as the world
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undertaken, of which Im is imported capital goods andis de-
mand for domestic labor and supplies. The entire value of I is
made available in terms of foreign exchange by, say, a foreign
grant. It is clear that 'm raises no problem at all. The goods are
imported against payment from the available foreign exchange
and, until they begin to be unloaded and thus start to be com-
bined with domestic resources, no call on those resources is made.
As far asis concerned, this will lead to a secondary demand
for consumer goods, both domestic and imported, and successive
rounds of income spending. To the extent that the derived de-
mand is for imports, there is again no problem: they can be
financed from the balance of 1 available. Indeed, assuming p < 1
(or, more generally, ep<1),some of the foreign exchange made
available will remain unused. To the extent that the demand is
for domestic goods, and their local supply is not infinitely elastic,
these will flow in, with perfect mobility, from other parts of the
country or from abroad. The price level of all commodities in all
parts of the country will remain constant, as any infinitely small
increase in prices would call forward additional supplies, either
from other regions or from abroad. There is no limit to the in-
vestment, assuming the requisite foreign exchange accompanies it.
But this ideal situation is a quite inaccurate description of
reality, particularly in underdeveloped countries. In such coun-
tries the cost of transport is high. Price differentials between
regions are enormous. The cost to the consumer of imports is
very considerably above their landed cost—if not because of
tariffs, then because of high markups, monopoly-type profits of
importers, expensive marketing. These factors make for a rather
inelastic supply of consumer goods when, on account of in-
creased demand, local supplies have to be supplemented by im-
ports. Not until the local price rises substantially will imports—
from other regions or from abroad—begin to flow in.60 Thus,
supply of food is concerned in connection with large-scale development in
all underdeveloped countries simultaneously.
60Therise in price occasioned by an increase in demand will be very
much greater if the increase shifts the country (or region) from being a
net exporter of, say, rice to being a net importer. The same high cost of
transportation and trade make for a wide spread between the prices of
export goods on the farms and in the villages, on the one hand, and at the
export level (f.o.b.), on the other. Hence, for the consumer, the difference
between the prices of rice at the rice "export point" and the rice "import
point" (to borrow gold standard terms) should be very large indeed. Or,
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investment will be accompanied by a rise in local prices even
though adequate foreign exchange is available. Some inflation
will occur.
Owing to the inflation, real income will be shifted from the
population at large to the relatively small wealthier classes. If
the money income rates of large sections of the population are
relatively inflexible, the shift in income to the higher income
groups might even exceed the increase in real income due to the
additional investment. In that case, the purpose of the develop-
ment program—to raise the real income of the low income groups
—will be defeated. Hence the existence of an optimum point of
foreign investment: the point at which the current loss in real
income of the low income groups in the population because of
inflation exceeds the discountedol prospective increase in real
income which may be expected from the new investment.
It is not suggested that a precise, or even a rough, figure can
be set for each country or for the underdeveloped world as a
whole on the basis of these theoretical principles. Their main
justification at this stage is to point out that there is an optimum
of this sort. The existence of an optimum can also be observed
from the postwar experience of a country which has built a very
high rate of investment on the basis of (or at least supported by)
large foreign grants. The Philippines, from 1946 to 1949, devoted
about 25percentof its national income to investment.62 Assist-
ance from the United States in various forms enabled the country
for a number of years to proceed in this manner without balance
of payments limitations. But it is doubtful whether this rate of
investment, with the attending high level of prices, was to the
benefit of the population at large. Indeed, it seems quite reason-
able to maintain that the Philippines would have been better off
with a lower rate of investment.
The fact that one country (or a 63canbe shown to have
received more than the optimum rate of investment would tend
to support the existence of such an optimum. But the optimum
obviously does not exist in absolute terms—as x percent of the
Sinotherwords, the elasticity of supply beyond the export point may be
very small.
Note that a rate of interest is implied—the (very high) subjective rate
applicable to the low income groups in the underdeveloped countries.
62EconomicSurvey Mission to the Philippines, October 9, 1950.
63Greecealso seems to be a case in point of a country receiving more aid
than was good for its economy.
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national income. A great deal will always depend on the partic-
ular nature of the investment program. Above all, the limit will
depend on the measures taken by the government to increase
the elasticity of supply in the whole economy as well as on meas-
ures to increase savings. To give one example: A large public
works program in which workers are paid money wages with
which they bid up food prices until imports flow in may be
seriously inflationary; while the same program may be perfectly
tolerable if the government, with the foreign exchange available
to it, purchases foodstuffs abroad and distributes them as wages
in kind.
It is clear from this that an optimum rate of investment can
be determined for each country only on the basis of a plan—not
only of the cost and the nature of the program, but also of the
manner in which it is to be carried out.
As these plans come gradually into being, and the experience
of tolerable and intolerable rates and conditions of investment
is gathered in various countries, it will become possible to obtain
an impression of the magnitude of the optimum rate of investment.
It might be found that the distance between this optimum and
the amount the United States and other capital-exporting coun-
tries are prepared to make available is not too great.°4 In our
present state of knowledge, however, we cannot give any con-
fident answer to this question.
COMMENT
SOLOMON FABRICANT, New York University
1. From among the many interesting things in Mr. Polak's stimu-
lating paper, I can select only a few for examination. There is,
first, his proposal for projecting U.S. imports. The ratio of im-
ports to gross national product has followed a downward trend
in the past. Given a projection of CNP, he suggests, we may use
an extrapolation of the trend in the ratio to project the trend in
imports.
My first comment is on the historical trend in the ratio of im-
ports to GNP. Mr. Polak notes the irregularities in the movement
of the ratio, but concludes that "in any case," there is suflicient
evidence for a downward trend. Yet the irregularities cannot be
ignored when we are projecting one or two decades into the
future. According to Polak's Table 3, the ratio changed between
64Altermaking allowance for domestic saving and private capital imports.
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adjacent averages by the following number of percentage points:
—1.1, +0.2, —1.7, +0.4, —0.6, —1.6, —02. The differences
among these figures may seem small, but they must be referred
to an average percentage of only 4 or 5.
There is, next, the question whether the trend in the above
ratio is a simple function of time. Would the ratio continue to
fall whatever happened to CNP? Polak himself explains the
downward trend by the rise in per capita income. If national in-
come stopped rising more rapidly than population, the ratio of
imports to GNP might stop falling. This suggests a revision of
the formula for projecting imports.
But we can hardly stop here. Nor would Polak, for he appeals
for a "more intensive study...ofindividual commodities" (Sec-
tion B-6). This might take the form of an investigation of changes
in the ratio of imports to output in each of our industries and
changes in the relative importance of industries with high and
low average import-output ratios. (This, too, is implied by Polak
when he speaks of the declining ratio of imports to GNP as the
result of increased self-sufficiency and of the rise of the service
industries.) Then we would have to explain these changes, before
we could use them as a basis for projecting total imports. And
this explanation could not avoid bringing in certain developments
abroad, so that the explanation of U.S. imports would not run in
the simple terms of "variables which themselves are part of the
U.S. economy" (Section C). It is safe to say that we would find
the historical trend reflecting the net result of a number of forces
acting in opposite directions, and that the weights of these forces
have been shifting. Were such an analysis available, I am not
sure that we would project a trend in the ratio of imports to
GNP that continued to decline at the historical average rate, or
even declined at all.
2. When it comes to projecting U.S. exports, Polak avoids the
major task of dealing with the national products and other do-
mestic variables of countries in the rest of the world by assuming
that, unlike the United States, their national products are de-
termined by their exports, and ultimately by the rest of the world's
exports to the United States. To construct the projection formula
for U.S. exports, it is necessary to derive a few parameters from
data for other countries, but these "have a certain degree of con-
stancy" (Section C-i-c). Fundamentally; the only explicit inde-
pendent variable is U.S. imports.
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The justification for this is essentially the claim that "in most
foreign countries, factors coming from abroad are the most im-
portant factors responsible for fluctuations in national income and,
hence, in imports; and quite often these factors outweigh domestic
factors in the explanation of changes in imports" (Section C).
Here we have the rather widely accepted theory that the U.S.
exports depressions (or business cycles). But even if we could
have confidence in this explanation of fluctuations, it is difficult
to see the justification for applying the argument to trends'.
Polak is a little vague as to how the parameters are to be de-
rived. Historical data are not satisfactory, for in contrast with
the continuity of the U.S. situation, a great "structural" change
has occurred in the outside world. The behavior patterns sum-
marized by the parameters can be put only in terms of a new
post-World War II set of habits: "a great many countries have
such urgent development needs...thatthey have a persistent
tendency to overimport" (Section C-i-a); unlike the past, the
effect of capital imports must be multiplied by an "expansion
ratio" (Section C-i-b); and so on. We may appreciate the need
to recognize that the economic world has changed. Nevertheless,
two questions require some discussion: first, why no allowance
needs to be made also for important changes in the United States;
and second, why the changes abroad must be viewed as revo-
lutionary.
Having argued that the "coefficients have a certain degree of
constancy," Polak goes on to admit that, "to be sure, there are
long-run shifts reflecting the emergence of new import trading
countries, new consumer demands, and new techniques;..."
(SectionC-i-c); and to indicate his unwillingness to "imply that
the country's response to a particular change will always be the
same or will be constant over time" (Section C-i-a). This, it
seems to me, takes the heart out of the argument that projections
of U.S. exports can be determined primarily by reference to U.S.
imports. Once changes in the parameters are admitted, Polak
must also admit, as he in fact does (but only with reference to
"rather long" periods), that "to do a reasonable job with refer-
ence to forecasting ...itwill be necessary to take account, as
best one can, of knowledge of the shifts" (Section C-i-c). Polak
does not define a "rather long" period; but, if it is one in which
such changes may become too important to be ignored, my guess
is that it is as short as two decades and possibly even one.
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3. Polak assumes that (private) foreign investment isde-
termined by trade. There can, of course, be no question that im-
ports and exports influence foreign investment. A country ex-
porting railroad equipment and financing the export by loans
raised within it provides an obvious example, and so does a
country exporting oil and hoarding the royalty proceeds abroad.
It is also true, however, that foreign investment influences im-
ports and exports, and economists have been studying the mech-
anism for generations. But Mr. Polak assigns only "official loans
and grants" to the role of independent variable. A major diffi-
culty in projecting foreign investment stems out of the complex
interaction between investment and trade, and Polak's assump-
tion is an effort to skirt it. I wish it were that easy.
4. One of the conclusions drawn by Polak from his analysis
is that "an increase in U.S. imports will lead to a smaller increase
in U.S. exports" (Section C-1-d), other things remaining the
same. This is mainly because ("or if one prefers," Polak is frank
to say, "on the assumption that") foreign countries tend, on the
average, to increase their imports less than their exports increase.
As change in world imports equals change in world exports, it
follows that increase in U.S. imports must be greater than in-
crease in U.S. exports. Is the reasoning (or "assumption") ac-
ceptable? Consider the implications: the difference between
changes in exports and in imports is(roughly) equal to the
change in foreign investment; U.S. imports have an upward
trend; therefore, on Polak's theory, there is a secular tendency
for U.S. foreign investment to decline. This curious conclusion,
it seems to me, can only raise doubts about the theory on which
it is based.
5. In his discussion of the optimum rate of capital inflow, Mr.
Polak reminds us that the simple aggregate of a nation's income
is an incomplete criterion of its economic welfare. His own cri-
terion is in terms of the "low income groups," the "bulk of the
population," but I imagine he would not object to taking account
of the whole income distribution. This would avoid arbitrary
definition of "low income," would allow for inequalities at the
lower end of the distribution (which some feel to be more in-
jurious than the disparity between the very rich and the "bulk"
of the population), and would give some weight (as most of us
would wish) to the impact of development on the "high income"
groups. Just what measure of inequality of income distribution
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is appropriate, where to secure the necessary data for its calcula-
tion, and how it should be weighted relative to the average level
of income, when judging how far to push an investment program,
are questions which reinforce Polak's own conclusion that his
criterion is still in the "theoretical" stage.
If we are going to broaden our criterion, perhaps we should
allow, also, for the enormous noneconomic costs of change in
habits and places of working and living encountered by develop-
mental programs. These costs might go as negative items into the
calculation of average real income (with a weight base shifting
as adjustments are made and new habits learned), or they might
constitute a third element in the criterion. Their inclusion would
not make application of the criterion any easier.
6. Mr. Polak's comment on the bottleneck criterion of optimum
rate of capital inflow raises again the question of how long the
short run is. To increase appreciably the number of physicians
in a backward country, to use Polak's example, might well take
a generation or more. But bottlenecks never disappear: they only
change their form. Economic development is a process in which
bottlenecks are constantly being discovered and broken. Educa-
tion, trade connections, habits of work, commercial (and political)
ethics, to speak only of "intangible" capital, must be improved.
It is a slow process. This means that the rate of economic develop-
ment must be planned and benefits of capital inflow must be
calculated with an eye to these requirements. Development plans
must have a time dimension; and every "optimum rate of capital
inflow" also must be "dated."
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